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 ABSTRACT: Which is the relation between logic and philosophy of mind? This work tries to answer that question by 
shortly examining, first, the place that is assigned to logic in three current views of the mind: Computation-
alism, Interpretativism and Naïve Naturalism. Secondly, the classical debate between psychologism and an-
tipsychologism is reviewed –the question about whether logic is or not a part of psychology- and it is indi-
cated in which place of such debate the three mentioned conceptions of mind are located.  
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What is there in recent philosophy of mind that a logician could be interested in? In 
my opinion, one should give to this question a two-sided answer. First, I contend that 
the place of logic is assigned to significantly depends on what the view of the is like 
and, in accordance with this point, I will briefly dwell upon three views of the mind: 
Computationalism, Interpretativism and Naive Naturalism. Secondly, I will consider 
the way in which logic is integrated in each of these views and show the new guise that 
the classical Psychologism thesis—whether logic is or not a chapter of psychology—
comes in. 
Minds as machines 
According to Computationalism, mental activity is nothing but the formation and ma-
nipulation of symbols, i.e., representations. To perceive, to make a decision, to imag-
ine are computation varieties, results of very simple operations that handle representa-
tions belonging to a language of thought (Mentalese in loose talk). A proposal con-
cerning which operations are those was provided in Alan Turing (1937). The essential 
feature of those operations lays in their only being sensitive to formal properties of 
Mentalese’s symbols. Two mental representations differ as far as they do not share 
each and everyone of their formal properties. These differences codify differences in 
their causal roles, i.e., differences in their causal antecedents and/or consequences, in 
their computational antecedents and/or consequences. Any system able to perform 
the extremely simple operations he identified, Turing had it, would have the resources 
to think. Minds are machines. Even more, since mental manipulation is a formal busi-
ness, minds are syntactic machines. 
 In delineating the foundations of the Computational view of the mind, logical the-
ory has much to say. The computationalist uses to think that logic has the key to un-
derstanding human intelligence and rationality. Mind not only comprises many diverse 
kinds of states, but a complex system of causal transitions among those states as well: 
perceptions that give rise to beliefs, beliefs that generate, and are generated by desires, 
desires that bring about actions, and actions that give rise to new beliefs, desires and 
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perceptions; and the whole cycle starts again. However, all this activity is intentional. 
This means that mental states have intentionality, content; semantics in addition to 
syntax. It is content that gives mental states part of their identity and explains why 
causal connectivity is the way we find it. How is it possible that intentionality runs 
along the web of causal transitions, how is it that causes become reasons—that is the 
question. Some believe that mental state content is a function of its causal relation-
ships to other states, to sensorial input and behaviour output (Loar 1981). Others ex-
tend those links to include real and possible objects and situations belonging to the 
environment that the mind might be nested in (Harman 1999). A third party (Fodor 
1987; 1994) chooses to hold that atomic Mentalese’s symbols win content in virtue of 
their tokens’ holding causal relations to properties instantiated by external-world indi-
viduals. Mental content, therefore, is a result of adequately combining those atomic 
meanings by compositionality principles that belong to mind architecture. 
 Logical theory has had a lot to contribute to make this realm surveyable. Logic’s 
general subject matter is the system of properties of terms and sentences that endows 
them with the form, i.e., the logical form, that explains why logical truth and contra-
diction, consistency, completeness, logical consequence and independence, etc. are 
properties sentences which any language might have or relations they might maintain 
with each other. Now, Computationalism holds that Mentalese is a language—the lan-
guage of thought. What we commonly call concepts are but its terms; and what we 
usually call thoughts are but its sentences. Therefore, in so far as their formal, syntac-
tic, properties and relations serve as semantic properties and relations we are in a com-
fortable position to understand how it is that intentional properties and causal transi-
tions are correlated to each other. In other words, to see why causal transitions among 
mental states are computational transitions (Fodor 1980; 1987). Turing hit on the right 
answer to this question in suggesting, first, that a computational system is a syntactical 
machine and, second, that it is filled up with semantics, i.e. intentionality, if there is a 
one-to-one mapping between content and form. 
 A lot of logical research can contribute to exhibit intentional properties more and 
more subtly embodied in formal niceties. A well known example, that has meant hard 
work for logicians in the recent past, is that of non-monotonic logical consequence: a 
sentence p follows from a set of premises A, while p does not follow from A È B. 
From a computationalist point of view, non-monotonic reasoning is characterized by 
the fact that those causal links that make you believe that p, if you believe each and 
every member of A, break down if to the beliefs in A you add those new beliefs in B. 
Logic and philosophy of mind thus feed each other. There is no access to the detailed 
workings of the mind that cannot be fixed in logical theory; no causal transitions that 
cannot be fit in a computational mould. For a logician, then, philosophy of mind 
throws the challenge of finding the way of translating causal roles into logical form re-
lationships. 
 There is one more thing I wish to underlie concerning the place of logic in a com-
putationalist conception of the mind. Logical analysis now becomes part of a project 
of naturalizing the mind, that is, of explaining what it is and how it works without re-
sorting to any concept except those which belong to natural science (Fodor 1987, p. 




97). Sticking to this requirement, the computationalist thinks that mental representa-
tion’s logical properties and relations supervene on their physical properties, i.e., on 
features of neural stimulation patterns. However, this way of fitting logical properties 
into a naturalistic scheme forces him to confront the demand from Psychologism—
Please, make clear why logical properties and relations have a normative value. This 
theory seems to be assumed by the computationalist in recognizing that mental com-
putation preserves logical properties and relationships. For instance, that if you accept 
that it is true both that p ® ~q and that q, then you accept that ~p as well. Thus, since 
mental processes seem to respect logical properties, we are entitled to conceive human 
reasoning as guided by normative principles. In the end, mental norms entirely rely on 
the logical form of the representations involved, and form supervenes on physics. 
 It has been repeatedly pointed out that this naturalistic strategy is doomed to fail-
ure. On the one hand, a wide range of either mistakes of reasoning (Piatteli-Palmarini 
1996; Stanovich 1999) or ways in which the theory of human reasoning differs from 
the theory of logical consequence (Harman 1986; 1999) has been described in the last 
decades. On the other hand, Computationalism views the relation between logical 
properties and psychological processes as extrinsic. Content, i.e., concepts and 
thoughts, is assigned a place in reasoning as an index to causal transitions (Loar 1981; 
McGinn 1989). Moreover, if we deny that its normativity is, so to speak, imposed 
from outside, a psychologistic explanation of logic and semantics seems to be the one 
possibility left (Haugeland 1997, ch. 13; McDowell 1998b; McGinn 1989, p. 190; Res-
nik 1985). For reasons one can perceive, e.g. in Margolis (1997, § III) and Fodor 
(1998, ch. 1), not everyone feels this as a threat. Finally, several attempts to naturalize 
content, and logical properties with it, that started off more than twenty years ago not 
only have not made any significant progress (Loewer 1997), but their point is still 
open to debate since Kripke (1982) argued that there is no objective basis for inten-
tionality. 
Minds as texts 
The place logical theory has in Interpretativism widely differs with the one assigned in 
Computationalism. By Interpretativism I mean a family of views that share the convic-
tion that mental states and their reciprocal transitions make up a kind of text or inter-
pretable stuff. The key to this text is provided by the speaker’s behaviour, both lin-
guistic and non-linguistic, a stuff which is put under a triangulation technique that 
looks for the best fit among the speaker’s beliefs and desires, the meaning of her lan-
guage, and the way the natural and social world she inhabits and acts upon is. This 
way of interweaving mind, language and world naturally paves the way to the idea that 
mind is recognizable where there is room for interpretation. This is so because the ba-
sic subject matter of interpretation is intentional behaviour, action; not naked move-
ment, but movement filled with sense; movement successfully placed in a web of be-
liefs, intention, expectances, desires, etc. The need to make sense of action requires 
that the interpretee’s mental states and intentional actions cohere not only among 
themselves but to each other as well. Coherence is rationality, i. e. the kind of fit that 
makes both thought and action satisfy justification constraints. 
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 Among the many guises that Interpretativism adopts, two have circulated widely. 
In Donald Davidson’s approach the intentional agent has to be radically interpreted. 
This requires that the interpreter has to make himself familiar with the native’s lan-
guage and culture from scratch. He knows nothing of her community’s language, 
nothing of her systems of beliefs and values (Davidson 1980; 1984). A hypothetical 
point of departure like this neatly exhibits the reciprocal dependence of language and 
thought. There is no route to what the native’s utterances mean in her community that 
does not cut across her beliefs and desires. And conversely, no route to most of her 
thoughts and their contents that does not need an authoritative knowledge of her lan-
guage. With those restrictions radical interpretation starts off and goes forward, pro-
vided that the interpreter assumes that he is having dealings with a community of ra-
tional agents, men and women that believe what is manifestly true and desire what is 
manifestly good. The articulation of this intuition has given rise to the so-called Prin-
ciple of Charity (Davidson 1984). It guarantees that an intentional agent’s beliefs and 
desires, as well as her language, are linked to each other and to the world as they 
should. In this variant of Interpretativism, assigning content to mental states and 
meaning to words and sentences is a product of the best balance between forces that, 
coming from the world, mould the agent’s natural condition, inducing on him percep-
tions, beliefs and other mental states, and forces that bestow coherence on those mul-
tiplicity of states and reciprocal transitions. Intentionality is a result both of the agent’s 
natural condition and of the network of those beliefs and desires he comes to acquire. 
 According to the variety of Interpretativism sponsored by Daniel Dennett, the in-
tentionality of language and thought lies in the interpreter’s eye. All intentionality is 
derived. It so happens that there are behaviours and other events that are only made 
sense by adopting what Dennett has called the intentional stance, the kind of attitude 
that prompt us to treat things as if they had the sort of organization characteristic of 
intentional agents. By so acting we predict and explain what they will do or have done, 
by attributing them desires and beliefs. An intentional system—an electronic chess 
player, a lioness stalking her prey or a human being—is anything whose behaviour 
makes sense when seen from such a stance (Dennett 1978; 1987). Not anything is an 
intentional system. Thus, only in extraordinary situation carburettors, trees and jelly-
fish are given this title. There does not seem to be a neat answer to the question of 
where lies the border between intentional and non-intentional systems. 
 The way logic integrates into the interpretativist view of mind is dictated by the 
Principle of Charity. Logical theory substantially contributes to this view by making 
explicit what conditions of consistency and logical consequence a system of cognitive 
and conative states has to abide by if it has to be a rational one. Thus, a certain 
amount of logical theory has to be credited to the native on pain of not being con-
ceived by the interpreter as a bearer of manifest truths and values. How much—that 
has been open to a variety of opinions. As far as logical theory is concerned, Quine 
(1960, ch. 2) maintained that the speaker’s logic does not go beyond the basic princi-
ples the govern the propositional connectives (‘not’, ‘and’, ‘or’). Davidson (1984) ex-
tended to classical quantification the amount of logic that the interpreter has to see re-
flected in the native’s thought and linguistic abilities theory. Though these are two 




ways of substantiating the Principle of Charity vis-à-vis logical theory, other manoeu-
vres are still possible. In fact, it seems reasonable to think that the specific content the 
Principle may have would depend on what the interpreter’s constraints on logical con-
sistency and consequence are. 
 Now, it is an interesting feature of Interpretativism that, given the centrality it as-
signs to the Principle of Charity, this conception of the mind easily accounts for the 
normativity both of content and meaning. The intentionality of thought and language 
is of a piece with the rationality of mental states and intentional action, the reason be-
ing that there is content and meaning only where norms of justification concerning 
logical coherence are in force. 
 The last point helps one to become aware of an important difference between 
Computationalism and Interpretativism, namely, their different attitude towards the 
doctrines according to which the basic properties of the world are physical. While 
Computationalism’s vocation is openly naturalistic, Interpretativism in some of its 
variants rejects this creed. In Davidson’s view, this is a tribute we have to pay for the 
“fundamental difference [there is] between how we come to know what others mean 
and think and how we come to know, if we do, how the blood circulates or planets are 
formed” (Davidson 1994, p. 126). As for computationalists, such a difference is illu-
sory. Intentional properties are properties had by certain inhabitants of the world, and 
“if the ontological possibilities aren’t epistemologically constrained in physics, why 
should the ontological possibilities be epistemologically constrained in linguistics or 
psychology?” (Fodor & LePore 1994, p. 102). On the one hand, his rhetoric question 
implicitly carries with it the denial that both content and meaning are relative to pat-
terns and practices of interpretation. On the other hand, however, in doing so Com-
putationalism at least implicitly claims that the normativity of logic is not fact worth 
explaining. 
From minds to persons 
While Computationalism and Interpretativism have for the last decades commanded a 
lot of the attention of the philosophical world, many philosophers have considered 
their own views distant from each of those. As early as in the forties and fifties Gilbert 
Ryle and Ludwig Wittgenstein created a somewhat blurred tradition of thought that 
have cleared up other paths. Ryle advanced an influential argument whose target were 
not only Cartesian dualists, but their physicalist opponents as well. According to it, 
both Cartesian Dualism and Psysicalism err in wondering what stuff, whether matter 
or mind, we are made of. In Ryle's view (Ryle 1949), this question already contains the 
seeds of confusion, because to think and talk about anyone's mind is to think about 
her abilities, to think and talk in semi-hypothetical terms about people's behaviour. Pe-
ter Geach (1957/1992) showed that Ryle's dispositional view of the mind is incom-
plete, because many mental states do not have behaviours characteristic of them. The 
idea that perceptions, concepts, judgements, desires or emotions might belong to an 
independent ontological category, one that requires a pattern of conceptualisation 
made to measure, began to break through and quickly settled down among many phi-
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losophers after Peter Strawson's (1959, ch. 3) suggestion that all of them are proper-
ties of persons, and persons are not either immaterial minds or material bodies. 
 A way of articulating the intuition just mentioned takes desires, beliefs, perceptions 
or emotions as part and parcel of causal psychological explanation, and insists on how 
far is this kind of explanation from the one used in physics or chemistry (Baker 1995). 
Another view (Wittgenstein 1953/2000; Sellars 1956/1997; Hornsby 1998; McDowell 
1994; 1998a) has it that, in addition to conceive reasons as full causes, understanding 
human mind demands that its states and events be placed in a space of reasons. To 
understand is not to exculpate but to justify, as McDowell (1994) has put it. Following 
Hornsby, I will talk of Naive Naturalism to refer to this conception of the mind, a la-
bel inspired in the belief that it is possible to delineate a non-scientific view of per-
son’s nature. (This proposal, either present or found in Wittgenstein by many of his 
readers, connects the ideographic tradition of continental philosophy to English lan-
guage Analytic Philosophy.) 
 The question now is what role logic has been thought to fulfil in this conception of 
the mind. From an interpretative point of view, behaviour, linguistic or not, has to re-
spect logical principles in order to be intelligible. Any event admits of more than one 
description, but it emerges as rational when it is given an intentional description. Na-
ive Naturalism has it that every description of a mental state of theirs is subject to ra-
tionality demands, to norms of justification. The constitution of these norms ties 
down the relationships among mental states themselves and among mental states and 
states of the world to conditions that would not be met were those relationships con-
ceived as effects of neural mechanisms. In particular, no light may be shed on logical 
abilities if, in what would be a vindication of Psychologism, it is claimed that they are 
causal effects of those mechanisms. 
 In recent decades both Michael Dummett y John McDowell have insisted on this 
criticism, though they have disagree on the means to block the way to Psychologism 
(Dummett 1973/1991; 1993; McDowell 1998b). The problem of what format a theory 
of meaning should have has been the arena on which Dummett and McDowell have 
confronted their views on meaning and mind. They agree that a theory of meaning has 
to fix the contents of speech acts, both effective and possible, performed in a linguis-
tic community. In so far as a member of a community has command of the language 
used in it, a theory of meaning that assigns her speech acts the right content may be 
thought of as systematizing the speaker’s understanding of her language. The degree 
of fitness of the theory can be measured by taking into account how acceptable the 
descriptions of speaker utterances that the theory provides are. Those descriptions 
must display speaker utterances as performances of speech acts with a specific con-
tent, thus making them understandable in virtue of their relations to the speaker’s de-
sires, beliefs and further mental states. 
 How a theory of meaning explains that capacity is the point at stake between 
Dummett and McDowell. In Dummett’s view, the theory has to be robust: for each 
semantic value that it assigns to an expression of the language, it must contain a clause 
that somewhat states the public conditions in which any speaker of the language 
would recognize that the expression is adequately used. In addition, the theory has to 




be framed in a conceptual system that does not presuppose what it should explain. 
This implies that the theory is forbidden the use of terms like ‘…expresses the 
thought that…’, ‘…states that…’ or ‘asks whether…’. It is because it abides by this 
constraint that a meaning theory is immune to Psychologism. Moreover, from the as-
sumption that a theory of meaning indirectly deals with a rational capacity, Dummett 
gathers that it is also free from the dangers of behaviourism. On the contrary, 
McDowell thinks that a theory of meaning has to be modest: it has to map language 
expressions onto semantic values on the condition that the mapping helps making 
sense of both the speaker linguistic behaviour and her linguistic partners’ reactions. 
And making sense of it is something the theory will only achieve if it manages to ade-
quately describe the speaker utterances as performances of speech acts in a medium of 
mental states subjected to rationality constraints. (Thus, a non-intentional description 
of the sort of mental abilities involved in language use, i.e., a description of a complex 
neurobiological mechanism, is of no value for a meaning theoretician.) As a conse-
quence, Dummett’s manoeuvre against Psychologism is inefficient because “in theo-
rizing about the relation of our language to the world, we must start in the middle, al-
ready equipped with command of a language” (McDowell 1998b, p. 330). We are not 
cosmic exilees. There is for us no mean of analyzing maning and content with the help 
of conceptual materials from which our prior involvement incharacteristicaly human 
forms of life has been removed. 
 The question whether a theory of meaning should be robust or modest has deep 
implications on the debate on Psychologism and the normativity of logical principles. 
The question is, is the ability to deploy these principles a constitutive part of the 
speaker’s faculty of understanding? Dummett believes that the theory of meaning has 
to be robust: any the presence in the theory of any principle of that gives the meaning 
of a logical conective (‘not’, ‘and, ‘or’) should be under the control of a clause that 
puts forward the conditions under which the speaker becomes aware that the applica-
tion of the principle is justified. The normativity of each logical principle thus gets its 
own justification. However, he concludes, this constraint make us suspicious of the 
Law of Bivalence—every sentence is either true or false—and should lead us to 
choosing intuitionistic logic as base of a theory of meaning for a natural language. As 
contrasted with Dummett’s, a modest view is less demanding. The normativity of 
logical principles comes as a consequence of their being part to a theory of meaning 
that is globally checked for its success in accounting for the speakers’ capacities in 
thought and linguistic communication, and no separate justification of any logical 
principle is required. The real contribution made by the logical apparatus of a semantic 
theory does not go beyond guaranteeing that the meaning of a complex sentence de-
pends on the meaning of its sentence constituents. Because of it, principles like the 
usualy yielded in truth-tables (‘¬á’ is true iff ‘á’ is not true) are separately subject to 








Three conceptions of the mind and of how they make sense of logic have been put 
forward. For Computationalism intelligence, and rationality with it, is a mechanical af-
fair, and logic theory provides an abstract set of transitions among machine states. In-
terpretativism sees the attribution of logical abilities to speakers as following from the 
demands of the Principle of Charity as a condition for the possibility of radical inter-
pretation. Naive Naturalism sees logic as a precipitate of rational abilities that underlie 
language use and understanding. 
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